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On The Guise of the Good 
Joseph Raz1 
‘Every action and pursuit is thought to aim at some good’ 
Aristotle 
 
In an article which established this phrase2 as the standard name by which this 
ancient thesis is referred to these days Velleman rhetorically challenges its adherants: 
The agent portrayed in much philosophy of action is, let us face it, a square. He 
does nothing intentionally unless he regards it or its consequences as desirable.. .. 
Surely, so general a capacity as agency cannot entail so narrow a cast of mind. 
Our moral psychology has characterised, not the generic agent, but a particular 
species of agent, and a particularly bland species at that’.3 
To launch us on our way I will provisionally take the Guise of the Good thesis to 
consist of three propositions: 
(1) Intentional actions are actions performed for reasons, as those are seen by the 
agents. 
(2) Specifying the intention which makes an action intentional identifies central 
features of the reason(s) for which the action is performed 
(3) Reasons for action are such reasons by being facts which establish that the 
action has some value.4 
From these it is said to follow that  
(4) Intentional actions are actions taken in, and because of, a belief that there is 
some good in them. 
For most purposes we can ignore the second proposition, which is often assumed 
but rarely considered when discussing the Thesis. There are other ways in which the 
Thesis was understood and formulated. Velleman, for example, assumes a relation 
between intentions and desires. Explaining the rationale for the Thesis he writes:  
                                            
 
1  The paper benefited from discussions with Kieran Setiya, Nico Kolodny, Geoff Sayre-
McCord, and from helpful comments on an earlier draft by Nicholas Joshua The and David 
Enoch. 
2  Which is borrowed from Aquinas ST 1a2ae, 8, 1: what is willed is always willed ‘sub ratione 
boni’. 
3  D. Velleman, ‘The Guise of the Good’, (1992) reprinted in THE POSSIBILITY OF 
PRACTICAL REASON (OUP 2002) 99. 
4  Meaning: that there is some good in the action is the reason for it. 





The reason is that he acts intentionally only when he acts out of a desire for some 
anticipated outcome, and in desiring that outcome he must regard it as having 
some value.5 
I will remain non-committal about the relations of intentions and desires, and will 
therefore not discuss desires in this paper.6 The above statement of the Thesis 
presupposes cognitivism about discourse about reasons and values. Trying to state 
and discuss the Thesis in a way which is neutral between congnitivism and non-
cognitivism would unreasonably complicate matters. There should be little difficulty 
in applying the considerations below to non-cognitivist or other versions of the 
Thesis.  
On the face of it Velleman is blaming supporters of the Thesis for a factual mistake, a 
mistake about human psychology. Perhaps because they are bland and square they 
think that all people are. But it is more likely that he is merely teasing his fellow 
philosophers. After all, the Thesis fits Hitler and religious fanatics more 
straightforwardly than it does your neighbourhood grocer (as the examples below 
will illustrate), and they are hardly your common or garden square and bland types. 
Besides if it is wrong the Guise of the Good is more likely to be wrong about all 
people some of the time than about only some people all of the time.  Commonly 
alleged counter-examples to the Guise of the Good (for example touching a dark 
spot on the wall or passing one’s fingers through one’s hair ‘for no reason at all’) are 
hardly actions unknown to the square or bland among us. 
The Guise of the Good is best understood as a conceptual thesis; the three 
propositions constituting the Thesis are taken to be conceptual truths. Section 2 
considers the case for the first leg of the Thesis. It will lead to the formulation and 
defence of a revised version of the first part of the Thesis in section 3.  Sections 4 
and 5 will then tackle objections to the third part of the Thesis. But first, in section 
1, some different ways of understanding the Thesis are considered, and a prima facie 
argument for it is offered. In the final section I will raise the issue of the significance 
                                            
 
5  Ibid. 
6  In ENGAGING REASONS (Oxford: OUP 2000) I argued against the view of desires which is 





of the Thesis as it emerges from these discussions. Does it still fulfil the aspirations 
of its traditional supporters? 
1. Initial objections, clarifications & a prima facie case 
What could support the Guise of the Good, given the many apparent counter-
examples? Here are two such counter-examples: 
A: The miner: The management proposes to close the colliery. The miners vote on 
whether to accept the proposal and the redundancy pay which goes with it or to 
oppose it. You talk to one of the miners: ‘You are voting to stay put’. – ‘Sure’, he 
says. ‘So you must have some hope [of keeping the mine open]’. – ‘No hope. Just 
principles’. 
B: The fish: sitting in the bath Johnny, and it does not matter whether he is a child 
or an adult acting like a child, says: ‘I am a fish’ and beats the water with his open 
palm (presumably pretending to flap it with his tail). ‘Why did you do that, Johnny?' – 
‘That’s what fish do’. 
We can readily imagine how in cases like these it may be difficult to get the miner or 
Johnny to acknowledge that there was value in the action. The miner may insist that 
his vote does no good. He just had to vote that way. Perhaps, we may say, it is a 
matter of integrity for him. Johnny may be altogether puzzled by the thought that 
there was some value in the action. He was just playing at being a fish. 
We know how the argument develops, or one way in which it may develop. When 
thinking about their intentional actions agents do not necessarily think of them under 
the Guise of the Good, and they may not even be disposed to think of them in that 
way. That is, there may be no ready way, no readily available evidence or argument 
which would lead them to acknowledge that their intentions express, imply or 
presuppose belief in the value of the intended actions. So the Thesis assumes that 
when such acknowledgement is not forthcoming people nevertheless believe that 
there is something good about their intentions, or intentional actions (which 
therefore conform to the Guise of the Good), and are somehow mistaken if they 
deny that. 





agents believe that there is value in their actions. Let us allow, for the sake of 
argument, that reasons are facts which endow the action with some value.  Is action 
for a reason action taken in the belief that there is value in the action? There may be 
an alternative. It is difficult to deny that actions are intentional only if and because 
the agents are aware of some of their characteristics. But need they believe that the 
characteristics constitute reasons for actions? One alternative suggestion is that 
action for a reason is action performed in the belief that it has certain characteristics 
which the agent treats as reasons, that is as good-making. He need not believe that 
they are good-making, just as someone who believes a proposition treats it as true, 
though he need not believe that it is true. The analogy is Velleman’s. He thinks that 
that is the most that can be claimed by supporters of the Guise of the Good. But, he 
contends, this claim is true only if ‘take it as good-making’ means that one treats the 
characteristic in the same way one would if one thought that it is good-making, 
which can be the case even though one may believe that it is not good-making. 
Velleman’s point is that supporters of the Guise of the Good must resist this 
interpretation. They must understand ‘take it as good-making’ to mean take it to be 
good-making (though without believing that it is good-making), which – according to 
this suggestion – describes their attitude to the fact so taken. 
A terminological convention may help. Let’s say of people that they think that 
something is the case only when they believe so, and the belief is in their mind at the 
time. People have many beliefs which are not present to their mind. They believe 
much more than what they currently think about. Many such beliefs are remote from 
their thoughts, except on rare occasions. I believe that my mother was 30 when I 
was born. But it must have been some twenty years or more since I last had that 
thought. Applying this to the matter in hand I think that taking a feature of an action 
to make that action good in some respect is tantamount to believing that the feature 
is good-making. We say that the agents take the feature to be good-making rather 
than that they believe it to be good-making to intimate that they do not necessarily 
think of that at the time, but their conduct implies having that belief, it shows it to be 
one of their beliefs. It is not merely that they have the belief that the action has some 





take the action, and that it guides the action. It is not in their mind, but it is part of 
the explanation of what they do. There is of course the alternative understanding of 
what is meant by treating a feature as good-making, but as Velleman points out, that 
alternative does not support the Guise of the Good. So I conclude that to defend the 
Guise of the Good one has to accept proposition (4) above, that is that intentional 
action is action performed because of a belief that the action has some value. 
Supporters of the Guise of the Good must, therefore, attribute to The Miner and to 
Johnny, in the examples above, mistakes about their own beliefs, at the very least 
they must be held mistaken in rejecting certain characterisations of their beliefs. 
What could explain such a mistake? Two responses help to explain what is at issue. 
First, the notion of ‘the good’ or ‘value’ used in expressing the thesis is not to be 
confused with the concepts which are normally expressed by ordinary use of these 
terms. This is evident from the fact that in discussions of the Guise of the Good 
Thesis ‘value’ and ‘good’ are used interchangeably, even though they are neither 
synonymous nor does their normal use express the same concept. In arguing for and 
applying the Guise of the Good Thesis philosophers rely on a concept with broader 
applications than those associated with the normal use of those words. There is no 
point in trying to describe this concept here. It is familiar from the writings on the 
subject, and on value theory generally. And of course, one familiar aspect of it is the 
absence of agreement about its nature. 
The second response, made necessary by the first, as well as by other 
considerations, is that the Thesis does not assume that agents capable of intentional 
action must have the concepts used in stating the Thesis (the concepts of the good, 
intention, reason for action), nor does it claim that they believe that these concepts 
apply to each of their intentional actions. It assumes that they have a belief about 
their action which can be truly characterised as a belief that the action has a good-
making property, one which constitutes a reason for the action, and that reason or 
their belief in it, explains why they perform the action.7  
                                            
 





In attributing to the Miner, in the example above, the belief that the action is good 
because, e.g., it is required by principles, we are not distorting his views. We neither 
attribute to him a concept of value according to which being required by sound 
principles endows an action with value, nor do we ignore or pervert his distinction 
between actions which are good because they promote good ends and actions which 
are required by principles. We are simply describing his views using a broader 
concept of value, one which allows that an action can have value either because it 
advances the realisation of good ends or because it is required by a valid principle, as 
well as in other ways. 
More, however, is required to deal with Johnny. First, we need to distinguish Johnny 
the child from Johnny the adult playing at being a child playing at being a fish. We – 
their parents and others – attribute to children beliefs they do not altogether have, 
and concepts they do not altogether possess, and our doing so is a vital part of their 
learning process.8 Others may also have a defective grasp of concepts, and therefore 
a defective grasp of the beliefs which they use those concepts to express. Such cases 
are not counter-examples to this, any more than they are to other conceptual 
theses.  
How about Johnny the adult? Even when prompted he does not endorse the thought 
that there is something good in acting as a fish would. Possibly he would assent to it 
if subjected to a lengthy explanation and argument. But that is not the point. The 
Guise of the Good Thesis claims that he has the belief when he acts like a fish, not 
that he can be brought to adopt that belief. To maintain the Thesis, to show that it 
applies to people like Johnny, one has to establish that his pretending to be a fish 
discloses a belief that there is some good in acting like a fish, perhaps because he 
believes that imaginative play-acting is good, or for some other reason.  
There may be other positive indicators that Johnny does indeed have such a belief. 
                                                                                                                             
 
Explanatory’, and will not return to these matters here. 
8  I will not consider the conditions under which animals which do not possess concepts act 
intentionally, or have intentions, as I believe that those differ radically from the conditions 





But perhaps there are none. In that case defenders of the Guise of the Good will say 
that the fact that Johnny’s play-acting is intentional shows that he believes that there 
is some good in his action. They will, in other words, take the Thesis to be at least 
to some extent self-verifying. This may look like a refutation of the Thesis, but it is 
not. For example, we would not hesitate to attribute to Johnny belief that his 
brother is unmarried, on the sole ground that he believes that his brother is a 
bachelor, given that it is a conceptual truth that bachelors are unmarried (and that 
Johnny is a competent user of the language, or of some relevant segment of it).9 We 
do not require an independent ground for the attribution of the belief.10  
The difference, some will say, is that the Guise of the Good cannot be relied upon 
until it is established. True. My point was merely that it is no refutation of it, no 
argument against it that on occasion the Thesis itself is the main ground for the 
attribution of the appropriate belief. I will return to cases like Johnny’s once the case 
for the Thesis is examined. 
But what is the case for the Thesis? It starts from a crucial point, made by 
Anscombe, and recently emphasised by Setiya,11 namely that those who act 
intentionally know what they do (know it under the description under which the 
action is intentional, as some will add). In itself mere knowledge is consistent with 
the actions being done unintentionally. Agents may be mere witnesses to what is 
happening to them, or to what they do accidentally. What marks intentional actions 
is that they are done because of what their agents believe the action is (including 
what it may bring about). That means that what the agents believe about the action 
leads them to do it, and guides their doing of it, all the way to its conclusion, and that 
suggests that they approve of the action, given what they believe about it. They so 
                                            
 
9  It is important for the analogy that ‘My brother is a bachelor’ and ‘My brother is unmarried’ 
are distinct beliefs, just as intending to Φ and believing that there is some good in Φing are 
distinct mental states or attitudes. 
10  It would be different if one were to say not that Johnny believes that there is some good in 
his action, but that he was thinking that at the time.  
11  Anscombe, INTENTION ; Setiya, REASONS WITHOUT RATIONALISM (Princeton: 





act because they approve of the action, and that in turn means that they think that it 
has some value, since value is what we approve of. 
Human beings being what they are, their attitude to their intentional actions is often 
too ambivalent to say that they approve of what they do. They may retain doubts 
about the wisdom of their actions. They may believe that it would be better to avoid 
what they are (intentionally) doing. They may even do what they do because it is not 
the best thing to do, do it in order to hurt themselves, or someone else, or for 
other (explanatory) reasons. The Guise of the Good is meant to accommodate such 
ambivalent and akratic conduct by claiming merely that agents see some good in 
what they do, which they may do even when they are ambivalent or convinced that 
they are acting for the lesser good (or the greater evil).  
The Thesis does not express optimism about human nature. It is meant to 
accommodate not only mistakes, even gross mistakes about what is of value, but also 
anomic conduct in defiance of value.12 Its point is that intentional actions are actions 
we perform because we endorse them in light of what we believe about them, and 
that means that we must believe that they have features which make then attractive, 
or as we say, features which give them value. The thought is that endorsement 
presupposes an appropriate object. It does not presuppose that the action has 
endorseable properties, but it does presuppose that it is taken by the agent to have 
such properties.  
 Talking of agents endorsing their intentional actions is metaphorical. It is meant to 
point out a feature of intentional action of which the Guise of the Good is meant to 
be an account. It assumes that intentions are partly constituted by associated beliefs 
about the intended action, rather than merely by their felt quality, or by their 
direction of fit. The thought is familiar: Fear is what it is partly because those afraid 
think that they are in danger. Envy is what it is partly because the envious believe 
that the object of their envy is superior in some desirable respect (success, 
                                            
 
12  Compare Augustine's desire to steal the pears which, he said, he 'loved only for the theft's sake' and 
'Doing this pleased us all the more because it was forbidden. … I was being gratuitously wanton, having 
no inducement to evil but the evil itself' (CONFESSIONS, trans. Albert C. Outler (Philadelphia: 





reputation, happiness, possession of some advantages etc.). Neither can be identified 
by their ‘felt’ qualities alone.  The Guise of the Good takes a similar view of 
intentions. They differ from other mental attitudes or states which accompany some 
of our actions, the Thesis claims, by being constituted in part by a belief about the 
action and by its role in the acting. The belief has to explain why the agents took the 
action, i.e. it must figure in an explanation of their action which relates to the way 
they saw the action, and aspects of themselves and the world, and how that led them 
to take the action. Hence the Guise of the Good’s claim that intentions must include 
a belief that there is something attractive about the action, that it has some value. 
The preceding four paragraphs present a case for the Guise of the Good, which is 
good enough unless there are considerations militating against it. That is what we 
must examine next. 
2. Are intentional actions actions for reasons? 
The Guise of the Good is, whatever else it is, a thesis about intentions. How does it 
relate to intentional actions? There are independent intentions, as I will call them, 
which are ones one can have at a time one is not doing what the intention is an 
intention to do. My intention to fly to New York next week is an independent 
intention, as is my intention to complete this paper. I have the second intention 
while doing what I intend to do, that is while being engaged in the activity of bringing 
the paper to completion, but I can have it while I am eating, sleeping, or gossiping 
with friends. It is not an intention which I can have only when doing what it is an 
intention to do.  
On the other hand, when I (intentionally) drink some water the intentionality 
manifest in my action is an aspect of the action, an aspect of the way the action is 
performed. It could be that I am drinking the water because I have an (independent) 
intention to drink the water, but it could be otherwise. I may just distractedly pick 
up the glass of water and sip from it, while thinking about the implications of a flaw in 
my argument. My action is intentional, but there is no Intention with which I perform 
it. At other times while there is an independent intention with which I perform an 
intentional action it is not an intention to perform that action. When talking about 





hardly aware that I used that word at that moment. I did it intentionally because I 
intended (had the independent intention) to describe his holiday experience, and 
saying ‘went’ was part of that activity. I did not have an independent intention to say 
‘went’, but I said the word in the course of acting for an independent intention which 
I did have.  
Embedded intentions, the intentions present in all our intentional actions, are aspects 
of, manners of acting, and thus distinct from independent intentions even when we 
act intentionally because we have an independent intention. They consist in facts like 
that our actions are guided by beliefs about what we are in the process of doing 
(what we do if our action is to be intentional), so that at the sub-personal level our 
movements are continuously monitored and adjusted to fit those beliefs, and in 
other facts playing a similar role in the performance of the actions.  
Given this distinction between independent intentions and embedded intentions, 
which is the Guise of the Good about? The first part of the Thesis, as stated, is about 
embedded intentionality, as that is the feature which makes all intentional actions 
intentional. There can, of course, be a sister thesis to the effect that independent 
intentions to perform an action involve a belief that there is some good in the action. 
It may well be thought that this sister thesis is less vulnerable to objections than the 
Guise of the Good in the provisional form given it at the beginning of the article. I 
will return to this possibility. For the time being let us take ‘intentions’ in the 
discussion of the Thesis to refer to embedded intentionality. 
Consider Ignatius who placed a bomb in a regular commercial flight in order to 
destroy incriminating documents being transported on it, knowing with complete 
certainty that if the documents are destroyed everyone on board will be killed. The 
bomb explodes, destroys the documents and kills everyone. I think that Ignatius has 
murdered the people on the aeroplane, and that he did that by intentionally killing 
them.  
It is sometimes said that one Φs intentionally if and only if one Φs with the intention 
of Φing. In the preceding paragraphs I suggested that some intentional actions are 
not performed with an independent intention, and it is natural to say that they are 





intentionality, as I called it, that is, because of the manner in which they were 
performed.  But there is no need to make an issue out of a point of linguistic 
propriety. We can accept that whenever one Φs intentionally one Φs with the 
intention to Φ, provided it is understood that the intention need not be an 
independent intention. It may be merely an embedded intention, i.e. nothing other 
than the intentionality embedded in the action.  
Ignatius did not have an independent intention to kill the passengers and crew. He 
would have been just as happy, or even happier, had the documents been on a 
pilotless plane with no passengers, or if through a freak chain of events the 
documents were destroyed, but the passengers and crew were uninjured. But given 
how things were he did kill them intentionally. Therefore – by our terminological 
stipulation – he had an embedded intention to kill when acting to carry out his 
independent intention of destroying the evidence. His embedded intention to kill, his 
intentionality in killing the people, derived from his independent intention to destroy 
the evidence. More generally: 
Derived embedded intentions (definition): whenever one intentionally performs 
one action by performing a second action, if one has an independent intention to 
perform the second action, but no independent intention to perform the first, then 
one’s embedded intention to perform the first derives from one’s embedded 
intention to perform the second.  Putting it semi-formally: (x) (Φ) (ψ) [If x 
intentionally Φs by intentionally ψ-ing, and if x has an independent intention to ψ, but 
no independent intention to Φ, then x’s embedded intention to Φ derives from x’s 
embedded intention to ψ] 
Does Ignatius’s case constitute a counter-example to the Thesis? After all Ignatius 
intentionally killed people without believing that there was reason to kill them. This 
is familiar territory, and the responses to the alleged objection are numerous and 
well known. Some of them are more controversial than others, and there is no point 
in rehearsing them all. Think of one possible response to the objection, that is that 
Ignatius has a reason to kill the people, namely that the killing is a by-product of the 
destruction of the evidence, and Ignatius thinks that he has reason to destroy the 





Ignatius believes that he has reason to kill the people on board the plane. Rather it 
claims that because he believes that he has reason to destroy the evidence he has 
reason to perform those actions which he will be performing by destroying the 
evidence. This cannot be right. One’s belief (possibly mistaken) that one has a reason 
to do one thing cannot, in this way, generate reasons to do other things.13  
Possibly if Ignatius has a reason to destroy the evidence he has a reason (obviously 
not necessarily undefeated) to kill the people on the plane, though even this is far 
from clear. After all killing them is not a means to the end of destroying the 
evidence. Be that as it may it is irrelevant to the assessment of the Guise of the 
Good which is, as it must be, about people’s beliefs about their actions. That there 
was (possibly unbeknown to the agent) a reason to perform an action is no ground 
at all to think that it was performed intentionally. 
 So, does Ignatius believe that he has reason to kill the people? He may well not 
believe that, and if so he would not be mistaken. He believes that he has reason to 
destroy the evidence. But that, in itself, does not show that he believes that he has 
reason to do anything else, not even if he does believe that destroying the evidence 
will also constitute doing those other things. 
Nevertheless, the objection fails to undermine the Thesis. Ignatius intentionally killed 
the people because he killed the people by intentionally destroying the evidence, and 
he knew it (knew that that is what he was doing while doing it). All that the 
objection shows is that the first proposition of the Guise of the Good which says 
(1) Intentional actions are actions performed for reasons, as those are seen by the 
agents. 
should be augmented to clarify its meaning: 
(1’) Φ-ing is intentional only if, in the belief of its agent, there is either a reason to 
Φ or a reason to perform another action such that by performing it he will, as he 
knows, be Φ-ing. 
                                            
 
13  The claim in the text is a generalisation of a claim often made regarding instrumental 
rationality, namely that if you think that you have reason to pursue a goal you really have a 
reason to pursue the means to the goal. Several authors argued against this view: Broome, 






The question we face is whether the argument for the Thesis, namely that it 
contributes a vital element to the explanation of intentions, applies to the Thesis in 
this amplified form. We can reply by considering again the example: Had the 
embedded intention to kill the people not been derived from the embedded 
intention to destroy the evidence one might have felt that (1’) defeats the promise 
the Guise of the Good holds of contributing to the explanation of intentions. Had 
the intention not-supported by belief in a reason, not been derived from the other 
intention, which is supported by such a belief, it would have appeared that the Thesis 
applies to some intentions only. Therefore it is not part of an explanation of 
intentions generally. But given that the objection relies on derivative intentions that 
problem is avoided.  
The Guise of the Good explains non-derivative embedded intentions, and the 
derivative ones are explained by being derivative. There is nothing more to them. 
That is, it is not as if Ignatius has two separate (embedded) intentions. Rather, in the 
circumstances his (embedded) intention to destroy the evidence is extended, as it 
were, and counts also as an (embedded) intention to kill. As mentioned above, the 
intentionality of an action consists largely in its performance being responsive to a 
belief about what the action is to be. Ignatius’s action of killing the people on board is 
responsive to the belief that the action is to be a destruction of the evidence, and to 
no other. There is no independent existence to the derivative embedded intention 
to kill (beyond his knowledge that in destroying the evidence he will be killing the 
people). 
It is instructive to compare cases like Ignatius’s with some activities consisting of a 
sequence of actions14, activities such as giving a lecture, singing a song, driving a car, 
or walking to the door. Here too each of the actions, which in combination 
constitute the activity, is intentional. But while every one of them could be an action 
we attend to and think about, our attention to them is intermittent, and of varying 
degrees of intensity. Typically, agents are not aware of many of the individual actions 
                                            
 
14  To be distinguished from sequences of bodily movements which may constitute one action 





which constitute such activities (saying ‘and then’ in the middle of the lecture, or 
singing an A flat note, or indicating when driving, or slightly adjusting one’s direction 
when walking to the door, and so on). Consequently, agents are guided by 
knowledge of how to produce the sequence, and not by beliefs about the reasons for 
many of the individual actions constituting the activities.15  
Yet, these cases differ from Ignatius’s. While here too the performance of one action 
depends on performing the others, the dependence is very different. It is not a case 
of each of them being performed by performing another of them (though the activity 
as a whole occurs by performing all of them). Each requires different movements, or 
their absence, and each is governed and controlled by us separately.  Their 
dependence expresses itself by the fact that later actions are modified in light of 
earlier ones, so that all are governed (to various degrees of success) by the overall 
purpose of the activity as a whole. (If in driving I stray slightly to the left at one point 
I will compensate by turning slightly to the right and so on). 
This suggests that the embedded intentions of each of the actions which constitute 
such activities are governed by one or more independent intentions which determine 
the content of the embedded intentions, thus making the activity as a whole 
intentional: an intention to give that lecture, sing that song, drive home, and the like. 
It is tempting to go further and to claim that 
(5) Every intentional action or activity is governed by some independent intention, 
which determines the content of its embedded intention(s). 
If so, then the relationship of the governing independent intention to the embedded 
intentionality of the action merits careful exploration, which it cannot receive here. 
Roughly understood, if intentional actions are not only performed because of their 
                                            
 
15  Is it the case that they have conditional beliefs: that one should say ‘went’ when that is 
required to express one’s thought in the way that one started to express it, etc.? Any 
attempt to pursue this thought runs into complications which expose the implausibility of the 
suggestion. We simply know how to use the language, etc. No specific beliefs of this kind are 
involved. At the same time we may interrupt, divert or abort the sequence if we suddenly 
become aware that it requires an action which there is a clear and undefeated reasons to 
avoid – intentional actions, and semi-automatic action sequences are controled by subliminal 






agents’ belief in reasons for them, but are also controlled and guided by the agents in 
light of those beliefs, then the independent intention which involves belief in a reason 
for the action determines the content of the embedded intentionality which guides 
the performance of the action, to make it what it must be to conform to the 
believed reason.  
(5) can be supplemented by  
(6) Every independent intention involves belief in a reason for the action intended; 
and together (5) and (6) can replace (1’) in a new version of the Guise of the Good 
thesis. Is this new version immune to criticism? (6) seems plausible. I will consider it 
later on. The weakness is in (5). 
We can accept that in the case of many intentional actions their intentionality (their 
embedded intentions) is governed by independent intentions. Some such relationship 
between independent and embedded intentions is needed to explain how 
independent intentions lead to intentional actions. The question is whether all our 
intentional actions are governed in this way by independent intentions.  
We have already seen examples which show that not to be the case. Acts such as 
passing one’s hand through one’s hair while thinking or talking, or of idly scratching 
the surface of the table, and many others, are intentional, but normally the people 
performing them do not have independent intentions to perform them. This is not 
because they do not plan or decide on them in advance. Independent intentions, just 
like embedded ones, can be formed in the acting. They need not precede the action. 
Nor are they counter-examples merely because the agents are disposed to say that 
they performed these actions for no reason (or for no special reason). Such 
utterances can be reconciled with the Thesis by claiming that people mean that there 
is no reason worth mentioning, that the reasons are too insignificant to mention. It is 
just that while all the counter-examples of this kind are actions which can be 
performed with an independent intention, typically they are not. Normally they are 
on the periphery of their agents’ attention, and are genuinely performed idly, for no 
reason or purpose. But it is the core of (6) that independent intentions are 
constituted in part by belief in reasons or purposes. It is therefore impossible to 





refute (5), and with it the new version Guise of the Good. 
3. Revising the Guise of the Good 
Without (5) the thesis of the Guise of the Good must be weakened to apply only to 
actions which are done with an independent intention. (1) now becomes 
(1’’) Actions performed with an independent intention are actions performed for 
reasons, as those are seen by the agents. 
The rest of the thesis is unaffected: 
(2) Specifying the (independent) intention which makes an action intentional 
identifies central features of the reason(s) for which the action is performed 
(3) Reasons for action are facts which establish that that the action has some 
value. 
The problem is that this revised version appears not to be supported by the 
argument adduced at the end of Section One in support of the Guise of the Good. 
The argument for the Thesis was that it explains what it is to act intentionally, and 
how intentional actions differ from others. The counter-examples establish that 
there are intentional actions to which the Thesis does not apply, and that 
undermines its claim to explain the nature of intentional actions. But without this 
argument what is there to support the thesis? 
One is tempted to dismiss the counter-examples as dealing with insignificant actions. 
I have sympathy with this response, but it cannot consist simply of dismissing the 
counter-examples. To sustain the Guise of the Good we cannot rely on the 
insignificance of those examples. On the contrary, we need to establish their 
significance, their role in our life as persons, and to show how this is consistent with 
the claim that the Guise of the Good explains the nature of intentional actions, once 
the Thesis is adjusted to allow for the counter-examples.  
Nor is the task of explaining the significance of the examples likely to be simple. 
There are other counter-examples, which are very different from the ones 
mentioned so far. One well-known class of counter-examples is expressive actions, 
such as kicking whatever is nearby in anger, or uttering swear words in exasperation. 
Nor do these two classes exhaust the counter-examples. I doubt that there is an 
informative way of draw up a comprehensive list of types of counter-examples. But 





Hypnosis: Acting under the influence of post-hypnotic suggestion Jane goes to 
her wardrobe, puts on a dress then takes it off and returns it to the wardrobe. 
Kleptomania: Rachel, a kleptomaniac, picks up a tin of pickled gherkins in the 
supermarket, and leaves the shop without paying.  
Both Jane and Rachel knew what they were doing, and by all normal tests both acted 
intentionally. Both acted in a controlled way, tending to ensure that the actions 
would be successful (namely, that they accomplish what they intended to do). But 
both deny that they saw any reason to do what they did.  
In considering these cases it is useful to return to the case of Johnny playing at being 
a fish, and of course his example stands for many. There I have suggested he did 
believe both that there was reason to play-act, and that there was some good in his 
play-acting. He is, I wrote, mistaken in denying these facts. It would, however, be 
implausible to think that this is true in the types of cases we are now considering. 
The intentions manifested in them do not, in the actual circumstances of these cases, 
reveal a possible reason for their actions in which they might believe. It is not like 
the case of someone who plays at being a fish, where the obvious reason is that it is 
fun. Second, we have an alternative explanation of their behaviour which undercuts 
the case for thinking that they have a belief in a reason for their actions. While in 
Johnny’s case the attribution of belief that there was some good in the action did 
crucially depend on the Guise of the Good Thesis, it was also supported by these 
circumstantial, largely negative facts: the availability of a plausible belief to ascribe to 
Johnny, and the absence of an alternative explanation of his action.16 So, while I rely 
on the Thesis in my understanding of Johnny’s case, that reliance conforms to the 
general principle that belief is not attributed on the strength of a single indicator 
alone. The new types of cases are therefore different. They are real exceptions to 
                                            
 
16  More needs to be said: First, the mistake I attributed to Johnny is slight. It results from an 
incomplete mastery of the concepts of reason or the good. It is rather like the mistake of 
philosophers who reject the Guise of the Good. Second, it may be denied that classifying an 
act as a case of kleptomania provides an explanation. Kleptomania is a poorly understood 
condition. But we know enough about it to rule out some explanations, including the 
attribution of normal independent intentions. We know for example that kleptomaniacs 
often steal objects they have no need for and which they are eager to get rid off once the 






All of this notwithstanding, there is a strong case for not taking Jane’s and Rachel’s 
actions as damaging counter-examples. They are clearly exceptional, as the causes of 
their actions are inimical to the normal exercise of our powers of agency. Some may 
even challenge whether it is appropriate to call such actions intentional. I think that 
such doubts are unwarranted,17 but that does not matter. We can allow that such 
doubts are natural for the cases are ones in which normal powers of agency are 
temporarily reduced, become partially ineffective.18 That is why even though Jane 
and Rachel acted intentionally, and their actions do not conform to the Guise of the 
Good, they do not refute the Thesis. 
That means that explanations, and theses in the theory of action need not aspire to 
be exceptionless. I would go further and say that they should not aspire to be 
exceptionless, and if they are exceptionless that is a worrying sign, a sign that they 
miss important features of the situation. The examples under discussion bring out 
that being intentional can be a matter of degree. Actions are characterised as 
intentional by a variety of criteria, several of which can be realised to various 
degrees, making it appropriate to speak of degrees of intentionality. There are cases 
of which one should say: Yes, up to a point, or in a certain respects it was 
intentional, but in others less so. In some respects Jane and Rachel acted 
intentionally, but in others they did not. That is why their examples do not refute the 
Guise of the Good. That is a thesis about intentional actions, and if it is true of all 
                                            
 
17  To see that it is instructive to compare these cases with H. Frankfurt’s description of what 
he regards as acting under coercion (Frankfurt, ‘Coercion and Moral Responsibility’ in THE 
IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT, Cambridge U.P. 1988). It does not matter 
that his characterisation of coerced action is unduly narrow. His coerced actions are cases of 
people whose will is overpowered by the coercing action or circumstances, and they cannot 
help but do what they are doing. They act intentionally, but their actions are unlike what is 
normally understood as coerced action, which is action for a (perceived) reason to remove 
the threat. Frankfurt’s coerced person does what is necessary to avoid the threat, but not 
for a reason. He has lost normal control over his power of agency. I think that in this case it 
is even clearer that the Frnakfurt-coerced person is acting intentionally, but there is little 
reason to distinguish him from Jane and Rachel. 
18  Only partially ineffective for they act, controlling their conduct as they would had they 





fully intentional actions; and if one can explain the exceptions by showing that the 
facts which establish that the Thesis does not apply to them also account for the fact 
that they are examples of diminished intentionality then they lose their force as 
counter-examples.  
This burden is easily discharged in the case of Jane and Rachel: Their purpose, their 
goal of performing these actions, is, as it were, imposed on them from the outside, 
by a hypnotist or by a pathological condition, and that both stops them from 
conforming to the Guise of the Good, and makes their actions less than completely 
their own, and therefore intentional only in some respects. 
In another place I discussed expressive actions along similar lines.19 I argued that 
they do not conform to the Thesis precisely because of ways in which they involve 
loosened control over the actions, which means that while they are intentional there 
are respects in which they display diminished intentionality. How about the other 
counter-examples we noticed, those of idle actions like stroking your hair? I noted 
the instinctive reaction that they are insignificant kinds of action. There are two ways 
in which they are marginal or insignificant. First, they are performed when our 
attention is elsewhere. That, as in other cases, affects their intentionality: in most 
cases they are actions we routinely perform, and therefore we can perform them 
without attending to them. But it does not matter to us if they fail, or change their 
character. Our fingers may slide out of their routine rhythm. The action may be 
interrupted, and we may still not notice, nor would the agent mind that the action 
failed, or got transformed from, say, stroking one’s hair to gently flattening it. 
Second, typically these exceptions are relatively simple actions, consisting 
predominantly of routines of bodily movement. They do not include actions such as 
giving a party, campaigning in an election, or writing a novel.20  
The second point shows that these actions are of marginal importance. The first 
                                            
 
19  J. Raz, ENGAGING REASONS 36-44. One can also question whether expressive actions can 
be governed by independent intentions at all. I will not consider this question. 
20  There are complications and further distinctions. For example, I can find myself operating an 
ATM without having noticed what I was doing. But in that case, while my movements may be 





point shows them to be, while intentional, of reduced intentionality. The fact that we 
do not fully attend to them shows that. It follows from this that the action is unlikely 
to be one of securing a result which goes beyond the disposition of one’s own body. 
When one kicks a ball or turns on the tap one needs to attend to what one is doing, 
and one cannot attend to kicking a ball or turning on a tap without believing that 
there is a point to doing so. Again, these cases are exceptions because they are 
marginal cases of intentionality, not displaying all the features of intentional actions. 
The revised Guise of the Good Thesis has other exceptions. Not being able to 
classify them exhaustively I will mention only one other kind of exception:  
Nibbling after blood:21 An accident causing horrible injuries and mutilations has 
just happened outside Jamie’s window. The sight will disgust him, and he knows that. 
There is nothing he can do to help the injured. Yet he is powerfully drawn to the 
window, and is looking, feeling disgusted, and physically ill, at the sight. There is no 
doubt that he went to the window intentionally, and is intentionally looking at the 
injured people outside. I will return in the next section to the question whether 
Jamie has a reason to behave as he does. The crucial point is that he does not think 
he has such a reason, and yet his behaviour is intentional, and does not fall into any 
of the categories of exceptions so far examined. It should not be assimilated to the 
case of kleptomania. Jamie’s case is meant to be one in which the agent is naturally 
motivated to act, but can resist. Jamie cannot help but feel drawn to look at the 
scene but he can suppress the urge, and stay away from the window. His situation is 
rather like that of someone who has a sweet tooth, and having had lots of chocolate 
already, is taking another piece, even though he knows that he will feel nauseated.  
Jamie is another exception to the thesis, and his case cannot be explained away in 
the way the others were. It is not a case of diminished or marginal intentionality. Yet 
I doubt that it can undermine the Thesis. It is possible that Jamie believes that he has 
no reason for his action because he is conceptually confused about reasons. For 
                                            
 
21  I am indebted to Ulrike Heuer for this example. My name for it derives from McEwan: ‘Of 
the many things Lucy was noticing to-day, not the least remarkable was this: the ghoulish 





example, had he thought that one has reason to satisfy urges, like the urge to look at 
a gruesome scene (or the urge to have one too many pieces of chocolate) then he 
would have believed that he has reason to act as he does. Moreover, it seems 
plausible that if Jamie is mistaken about thinking that he, and people generally, do not 
have reasons to satisfy urges of these kinds, his mistake is a conceptual mistake, due 
to an incomplete, and somewhat mistaken understanding of the concept of a reason 
for action.  
Whether all these suppositions are true depends to a considerable degree on 
whether there is in fact a reason to satisfy such urges. I will return to that issue in 
the next section. For the moment what remains is to explain why exceptions which 
are due to a conceptual confusion do not undermine the Thesis. Whether or not 
Jamie’s is an apt illustration, the general point is that conceptual truths about the way 
people use concepts are bound to have exceptions when people misuse concepts. 
That is, given that the ability to use concepts involves the ability to misuse them, 
theses about concepts cannot be refuted by examples of their misuse. 
4. Reasons and Value 
It is time to examine the third leg of the Thesis, namely that reasons for action 
consist of the fact that the action has some value. I will now assume that the (1’’) is 
correct, that is that actions performed with an independent intention are performed 
for reasons, as those are seen by the agents, that is, I will assume that independent 
intentions involve belief that there is a reason for the intended action. The question 
under consideration is whether reasons for action are that the actions have some 
value. If they are then (1’’) implies that barring conceptual ignorance or mistakes 
actions performed with an independent intention are performed in the belief that the 
action has some value. 
The argument for this view will proceed in two stages, and be followed by an 
examination of some objections. The first stage concerns the character of reasons 
belief in which is necessary for action with independent intentions. Such actions, 
actions done for a purpose as we can also describe them, are actions which were 
done by people who had a view of their situation, and in light of that view found 





acknowledged). The reason must be something which makes the action one to 
perform, one which it would be good to perform, and that means that it must be 
something which renders the action desirable, namely a fact which shows some good 
in the action. In brief the reason the agent thought he had must be something which 
shows that the agent knew what he was doing, and not only that he felt, and 
witnessed himself being, propelled towards acting by some psychological condition. 
There must be something which he believed to be true of the action and which he 
took to make the action attractive. There must be something that decided him to act 
because what he took to be the reason seemed to him to make the action 
worthwhile. To take it to be worthwhile in the required sense, the agent’s attitude 
to the reason for which he acts must be capable of sustaining certain counterfactuals: 
Had the agent been aware (or had he thought that he was aware) of undesirable 
features of the action he would have formed a view on whether the features which 
provide, as he believes, a reason for the action still make it the action to perform in 
spite of its undesirable aspects.22 Such a view, and that is another conceptual 
observation, consists in some judgement on the relative importance of the good and 
bad features of the action.  
Setiya did more than anyone else in recent times to challenge the Thesis. He thinks 
that intentional actions are taken for reasons but not in the belief that there is 
something good about the action. We need to address objections to the Guise of 
the Good advanced by him and others. But there are aspects of his view that 
reinforce my belief that the Thesis is right. In particular, he underlines the fact that 
agents who act intentionally know what they are doing and why: 
It is sufficient to be acting for a reason that one meets the demand for an 
explanation of what one is doing and why. One need not also believe that the 
reasons for which one is acting are reasons to act in that way.23 
Setiya recognises the difference between reasons explanatory of an action and a 
normative reason for the action. Explanatory reasons of actions are facts which 
                                            
 
22  Though, as we must always remember, he might have acted for what he took to be the 
lesser reason. 





explain the actions. The following are three such reasons, possibly all truly explaining 
the same intentional action: 
Jill did it because she was jealous of Jim 
Jill did it because she felt a sudden rage; a sudden rush of blood to her head made 
her do it. 
Jill did it in order to inherit Jim’s wealth, as she knew that she would after Jim’s 
death. 
Only the last one explains the action by reference to a normative reason. Setya 
insists, and is surely right, that whenever one acts intentionally one believes in some 
explanation of one’s action. He is also right to insist that the explanation need not 
incline us, the spectators, to believe that the action was justified. Any and all of the 
above explanations can be available to the agent and none of them inclines me to 
believe that the action was justified. It is also right that being explanations of 
intentional actions they point to factors which (metaphorically speaking) pushed or 
pulled the agents towards the actions. But while there can be a number of 
(compatible but distinct) explanations of every intentional action, there must be for 
every action performed with an independent intention at least one explanation which 
meets an additional condition: it must explain why the agent decided to perform the 
action, rather than resist the pull towards it. Of the three examples only the last, 
only the explanation via a normative reason, does that. Depending on the 
circumstances the other explanations may be more revealing of the action, or they 
may constitute the more illuminating parts of a more comprehensive explanation 
which includes all three as elements. But only the third, killing to inherit, even 
establishes that the action was intentional (jealousy and a sudden rush of blood to 
the head, together or separately, may explain loss of control leading to accidental 
killing). 
Setiya’s account lacks the resources to distinguish between the first two explanations 
and the third one. Doing that is essential for an account of independent intentions. 
And, the suggestion is, what marks actions done with independent intentions is that 





agents have available to them explanations by reference to what they take to be 
normative reasons, namely explanations purporting to show that there is some good 
in the action.24 
The second stage of the argument is required to counter one alternative 
understanding of actions for a purpose, and of normative reasons. According to it 
the argument thus far shows only that in acting for a purpose one believes that some 
feature of the action constitutes a normative reason for it. It does not follow that the 
agent believes that there is some good in the action (thus rejecting the tail end of the 
previous paragraph). 
If, however, a fact cannot be a reason for an action unless it establishes that the 
action possesses some value, then in believing that there is a reason for an action 
one believes that the action has some value, unless one is mistaken or confused 
about the concepts of a reason, or of having value. So to deny that to act for a 
purpose involves acting in the belief that the action has some value one has to deny 
that to be a reason a fact must establish that the action for which it is a reason has 
some value.  How would the argument proceed? Imagine the following conversation: 
Jumping: Abe: Why did you jump? – Ben: It was the only way I could save my life. 
Abe: I can see that but is there any good in that? 
Or, imagine a different conversation: 
Job: Ben: Why should I go to the interview? – Abe: It will get you the job. – Ben: 
Why is that a reason to go to the interview? – Abe: Because if you have a job you 
will earn a living and will not starve. – Ben: I can see that, but is there any good in 
not starving?  
The last question in each exchange appears out of place, and redundant. The 
suggestion is that reasons can be just ordinary, i.e. non-normative facts. What is 
                                            
 
24  It is not clear whether Setiya’s own view (that necessarily when acting rationally one acts 
under the Guise of the Good, but irrational agents do not always do so) is inconsistent with 
the Thesis here defended. Irrational actions are by their nature deviations from the norm, 
and if those who do not conform to the Thesis are irrational (in part) because of their failure 
to act under the Guise of the Good. then, as explained above, while their actions are 





special about them is that they stand in a normative relation to an action, being a 
reason for it. To say of them that they establish that the action has some value is 
superfluous. It does not contribute to the fact that the reason is a reason. Therefore, 
acting for a reason need not involve belief that there is some good in the action. It is 
enough if it involves belief that one has reason to perform the action. 
 This view, I will argue, ignores rather than replies to what the first stage of 
the argument established. To examine this claim I will focus on Ben and his Jump, and 
consider it in light of two further hypothetical situations: 
Torture (and death): If Ben would be saving his life by jumping he would be 
immediately seized by people who would first subject him to severe torture and then 
kill him. 
Betrayal: suppose that to save his life Ben has to reveal the whereabouts of a 
document which will inform the evil regime of the identity of his colleagues in the 
opposition, who will be tortured and killed. 
Let us assume that Ben rightly thinks that were he in Torture he would have 
no reason to jump, and that had he been in Betrayal he would have had a reason to 
betray (i.e. to save his life), but a stronger reason not to do so. It seems reasonable 
to assume that in Jump Ben not only believed that jumping is the only way to save 
his life, but also that in the circumstances of the case that it would save his life is a 
reason to jump, i.e. that he is not in a situation like Torture, and that belief was 
relevant to his action, as he would not have performed it had he believed that his 
situation is one in which he has no reason to save his life. Similarly, we can assume 
that he believed that the situation is not similar to Betrayal, that is that it is not one 
in which while he has a reason to jump it is defeated by other considerations. The 
suggestion is not of course that Ben considers and rules out the possibility that he is 
in many specific situations where he would have no reason to save his life, or would 
have defeating reasons. Rather, the suggestion is that he entertains a general belief 
that he has an undefeated reason to save his life.  
The first stage of the argument above showed that to have that belief he 
needs to have and use certain conceptual capacities. Broadly speaking he must be 





sometimes more than one reason bears on the case for and against performing an 
action. It was further argued that we individuate reasons by the good they do, the 
good that actions instantiate. An action which saves the life of Abe, and protects 
some beautiful picture from destruction, is one we have two mutually re-enforcing 
reasons to perform. They are two because the action instantiates two distinct good-
making properties. For the purpose of the current argument we can accept that 
reasons are or can be ordinary facts, such as that jumping will save your life. That 
does nothing to undermine the argument that reasons are individuated by the good 
that conforming to them secures, and therefore that mastery of the concept of a 
reason requires some understanding of the notion of value. Therefore, given that 
action for a reason is action motivated and guided by belief that there is a reason, it 
also involves belief that there is some good in the action. 
As we saw earlier, this argument does not establish that all actions with 
independent intentions are undertaken with such beliefs. It merely establishes (a) 
that given the direct conceptual connection between reasons and value one is 
justified in attributing a belief that there is value in an action on the basis of a belief 
that there is reason for it, so long as there is no evidence that the agent does not 
have such a belief. (b) Evidence that the agent does not believe that there is value in 
the action in spite of there being a reason for it establishes some conceptual 
confusion on the part of the agent. (c) Given that action with an independent 
intention involves belief in there being a reason for the action, any serious 
conceptual confusion about the nature of reasons means that the action is intentional 
in some deviant way only. 
 Let it be accepted that the facts which constitute a reason for an action also 
establish that there is some good in it. The rejection of the Guise of the Good now 
comes to rest on an additional contention: that the action has some value is not a 
reason for it. Stating that it has some good is nothing but another way of stating that 
there is a reason for it. For necessarily ‘There is some good in Φing’ is true if and 
only if there is a reason to Φ. It now seems that rejecting the third part of the Guise 
of the Good (that reasons for action are such reasons by being facts which establish 





known as “buck-passing”.  
 Some of the reasons why “buck-passing” accounts of the good are false have 
been explained elsewhere25, and the matter cannot be fully examined here. In 
rejecting the view I will say no more than that the good of inheriting, surviving, 
getting a job, having friends, etc. does not depend on there being a reason to bring 
them about. We can establish their value without raising the question whether there 
is reason to bring them about, and if we conclude that there is reason to bring them 
about that is because they are valuable. Hence, on cursory examination buck-passing 
fails to grasp the nature of value. But without it the alternative to the third leg of the 
Thesis fails. 
5.  Some Objections Considered 
 That concludes my two step argument for the Thesis. Can it be sustained in 
the face of the objections it faces? One of them has to do with value inversion, 
namely the fact that sometimes people sincerely take themselves to be acting against 
value, choosing actions because they are evil, bad, or worthless, and doing so with 
open eyes. Such cases hold many fascinations for the theorist as well as many 
horrors for those at the receiving end. I have discussed them elsewhere26, where I 
explained that another reason for many theses in theory of action not being 
exceptionless is the ability to deviate from any norm, including those of meaning and 
rationality. Not all deviations are possible, but (given that determination of our 
beliefs, intentions, emotions and so on is governed by multiple criteria) much is 
possible. I will not return to that discussion here. There are other objections:  
One objection has to do with cases where agents do believe in normative reasons 
for their actions, but in ones which do not establish any value in the action (for 
example, that it was undertaken to preserve racial purity). 
Second, there are those alien cultures whose normative reasons seem to be entirely 
unrelated to anything we can make sense of. 
                                            
 
25  E.g. U. Heuer, 'Explaining Reasons: Where Does the Buck Stop?' in JESP 1:3, March 2006. 





Third, there are familiar cases in which the agent’s judgement that there was no 
value in the action or that there was no reason for it is hard to dismiss as a case of 
being mistaken about his own beliefs. Jamie’s case above belongs here. 
The first of the objections requires us to revisit some of the ground already covered. 
Think of Jill who kills her uncle to inherit his fortune. We can assume that she will 
deny that there is any value in her action, and dismiss this as irrelevant because she is 
likely to be applying a different concept of value, perhaps one in which only moral 
values are values. But why impute to her a belief whose articulation requires a 
concept she does not have? Because she takes the fact that as a consequence of the 
killing she will inherit from her uncle as a fact which explains her action, in the 
required way, that is by being a feature of the killing which determines her to kill, not 
merely one which makes her kill. It guides her deliberation and is subject to rational 
constraints.  
This shows that inheriting is a rational factor in her mind, that it does not explain her 
action in the way that the influence of alcohol might. And as a rational consideration 
militating for the action it is capable of being seen to be in competition with still 
further considerations. For example, the fact, should she learn of it, that if she kills 
her uncle she will sleep no more will give her pause, and may or may not lead her to 
desist.  
Jill furnished us with the outline of an argument of why it is right to attribute 
belief in value to a person who explains his action in non-normative terms and 
declines to apply normative concepts to it. But it was an easy case, because it makes 
sense to think that she has the belief we attribute to her at least in as much as the 
feature of the action she points to (inheriting from her uncle) has value (even though 
not one justifying killing anyone). Now suppose that you see Brian punching and 
kicking a person in the street. You ask him why and he says: ‘he is a bloody 
foreigner’. ‘But what reason do you have to beat him up?’ ‘That is the reason: he is a 
foreigner’. ‘Why is that a reason?’ ‘It just is’. End of conversation, and end of Brian’s 
own thoughts about the subject.  
Here there is no value at all in the action. What can justify attributing to Brian belief 





Brian’s case is like that of Jill. He regards the fact that his victim is a foreigner as a 
normative reason. He too recognises other reasons, and can reason which of them, 
if any, prevails when they conflict. Patient inquiry will show the contours of his 
beliefs, and disclose what normative concepts are apt to describe his views, and they 
will be concepts which show what, in his eyes, is good in this or that action. 
It still remains unclear how the Guise of the Good can be reconciled with the 
possibility of mistakes. There is no difficulty if the mistakes are purely factual. The 
claim that Jill kills her uncle because (let us assume) she thinks that she will have a 
better life if she inherits from her uncle is consistent with her being mistaken about 
the prospect of inheriting. Maybe her uncle changed his will the week before, etc. 
There is no difficulty in reconciling such mistakes with the Thesis. But is it consistent 
with normative mistakes? Imagine someone who explains that this person deserves 
better treatment than that because he belongs to a superior race so that his 
interests count for more than the interests of members of inferior races, or that sex 
with people of inferior races is wrong because it dilutes the purity of the race, and so 
on. If he shares our concept of the good, and believes that racial purity is good, then 
that is his mistake. But assume that, as in our previous examples, our racist does not 
have our philosophical concept of the good. He does not admit to a belief that 
preserving purity is of value. In fact preserving racial purity has no value. What 
grounds do we have to attribute to him a belief which neither he nor we admit to?  
The answer depends on our racist’s grounds for his racism. He may believe that 
racial mixing leads to strife, or that it causes members of both races to fail to excel 
in the use of racially specific talents which he believes them to have. Such reasoning 
shows that he takes racial purity to be instrumental to genuine values such as the 
avoidance of strife, or the development of one’s talents. He is wrong about the 
relationship between the ideals of purity, harmony and fulfilment of one’s potential. 
But given that he subsumes the mistaken value under real ideals or values it is plain 
that he believes that his racist actions have some value.  
A difficulty exists only when the agents under discussion do not defend their belief in 
their false values by reference to any genuine values. They take them to be ultimate 





such cases there may be direct evidence that these agents take their reasons, 
however misguidedly, to show that there is some value in their actions. For example, 
they are likely to recognise the relevance of questions of consistency, logical or 
factual, between their alleged consideration and others, which are genuine values. 
They may, of course, believe that their reasons are consistent with those values. And 
it may be impossible to convince them otherwise. That is neither here nor there. In 
acknowledging the relevance of the issue to decisions about what to do, or to 
whether their reasons are sustainable, they show that they treat their reasons as 
facts which contribute to the value of actions. 
What if the agents are indifferent to the relations of their racial reasons to 
genuine values? They may have some priority rules, avoiding the need for reasoning 
about the relative case for one or another consideration. This scenario is even 
clearer when we turn to the third of the classes of cases I listed above, the case of 
thoroughly alien cultures. In the nature of things there are no examples to give. We 
imagine a culture where the concepts used in stating reasons for action are alien to 
us, and have no equivalents among our normative and value concepts. Possibly such a 
culture is not possible, at least not among humans. Be that as it may the general 
argument given earlier, namely that independent intentions are formed for believed 
reasons, and that reasons relate to value, apply. The alien culture is not a counter-
example. To be that we need to understand it. All we can say is that it is a culture of 
concept-using people, who can act intentionally. That, given the general argument for 
the Guise of the Good, is enough to establish that the thesis applies to them, and 
our ignorance prevents us from finding anything to challenge or undermine the 
conclusion. 
There will be the inevitable charge that in claiming that the Thesis applies to alien 
cultures we distort their meanings, and impose on them ‘our’ concepts which are 
not suited as tools for understanding their culture. But the charge is unwarranted. 
No claim to understand alien cultures was made. The concepts used in the Guise of 
the Good are “our” concepts, and there is no pretence that they are not. Nor are 
they used to interpret aliens’ world view, or their ways of justifying actions. Only 





concepts (or it would not be a culture) and that sometimes they act with 
independent intentions. The Thesis is true of them for no other reason than that it 
states part of what is involved in having independent intentions, and in acting 
intentionally. 
Finally we have to address the third kind of objection, illustrated by the nibbling after 
blood type cases. Jamie, you will remember, intentionally goes to the window to look 
at the gruesome sight which makes him sick. He thinks that looking at it has only 
disvalue, and he should not act as he does. How can we say that in spite of this he 
really believes that there is value in his action (or for that matter that there is a 
normative reason for it)? The answer is in the details of the case. One misguided 
objection to the Thesis points out that sometimes we act in pursuit of desires which 
arose in us neither by deliberation nor in response to recognition of the value of 
their satisfaction. Hunger, thirst and sexual desires are examples. In many such cases 
we recognise the value of satisfying such desires once they arise, thereby recognising 
that there are reasons (not always undefeated) for satisfying them. These cases are 
therefore not counter-examples. The value of satisfying such desires is sometimes 
the value of having the desire and satisfying it. Food and sex are among the good 
things in life and they are better if we have them when we desire them. Even with 
food and sex the desire for them does not always come when it would be good to 
have them. Sometimes the only value in satisfying the desires is to get rid of them.  
In his own eyes Jamie’s case is rather like that. He thinks that there is nothing 
intrinsically good in looking at gruesome sights whether or not that is done in 
response to an urge to do so. That is what he is telling us when he denies belief in 
the value of the action. But he could have resisted the urge, and he did not. He 
decided to go to the window and look at the sight. That shows that he takes it that 
there is some value in his action. It will relieve him of the tension of wondering what 
things are like, wanting to see them, regretting not having done so. It will probably 
also give him some satisfaction, some pleasure, which he does not understand and 
probably does not want to understand. He looks out in order to rid himself of the 
urge and the tension it produces, and probably also in order to get that pleasure.  





value in his action, given that he denies having the belief in its value. I think that his 
denial shows that he disapproves of his own action even while he is so acting. But 
that is typical of cases of akrasia, and Jamie’s is one of them. In acting with an 
intention to see the gory sight he is acting in the belief that there is some good in so 
doing. But his disapproval of his own action leads him to be less than completely 
honest with himself. He is reluctant to admit to the satisfaction he derives, and 
confines himself to referring to the nausea he feels. His emphatic disapproval 
overpowers any recognition of the value of relieving his urge, which he does not 
want to acknowledge as a benefit, even though he knows that it is. 
 6. Concluding remarks 
Velleman complained that the Guise of the Good takes people to be square and 
bland. I suggested that it applies not only to larger than life fanatics like Stalin whose 
reasons we can understand but also to people who defy comprehension. Moulay 
Ismail was supposed to have said: "My subjects are like rats in a basket. And if I do 
not keep shaking the basket, they will gnaw their way through."27 By all accounts he 
behaved accordingly. I doubt that Moulay Ismail was square or bland. Those who 
read the quotation as simply expressing concern for his continued rule 
underestimate him by ignoring the attitude to other people which it expresses. I do 
not think that I can understand many of his actions. Of course, we have learnt to 
expect the worst of people. We may be shocked by stories of his conduct, but are 
not surprised. Something like that is what we expect to happen from time to time. 
That does not establish that we understand his reasons. Yet we have reason to think 
that the Guise of the Good was true of him, for even though much of his brutality 
was spontaneous, his actions were commonly informed by independent intentions. 
 Of course, the Thesis which I was defending is neither the one which Velleman or 
Setiya and other critics objected to, nor the one that others upheld. The question 
arises whether the modified Thesis retains the philosophical interest and the promise 
                                            
 
27  Sultan Moulay Ismail was the founding father of the Moroccan royal Alawite dynasty. For our 
purposes it does not matter whether the attribution is true. It is enough that people can 





that the criticised Thesis held. In particular, can it still be seen as providing a key to 
the understanding of rational agency by explaining the nature of intentions? A brief 
survey of the modifications made and of one or two other points made in the course 
of argument suggests an affirmative answer. 
The revised Thesis presupposes a distinction between embedded and independent 
intentions. It does not claim to apply to embedded intentions except in as much as 
they depend on and their content is determined by independent intentions. Hence it 
applies only indirectly (if at all) to derived embedded intentions, and it does not apply 
to intentional actions not governed by independent intentions. Even regarding 
independent intentions it allows for exceptions, provided they can be explained as 
deviations from the norm, either by being cases of less than complete intentionality 
or as anomic inversions of the norm. Finally, I emphasised that the Thesis attributes 
to agents belief that the action has some value-endowing property and that they 
recognise it as value-endowing. They need not be able to express that belief in 
words, and they certainly need not have the more general belief that their reason for 
the action is that it has some value (rather than that it has the specific value they 
take it to have). 
This last clarification is vital to make the Thesis plausible. It would be absurd to 
assume that intentional actions presuppose possession of abstract concepts, nor 
does the purpose of the Thesis require it to assume that. This clarification does not 
undermine the claim of the Thesis to express a central element of intentional action. 
The other modifications and clarifications are not ad hoc. They arise out of the 
general nature of theses about concept-employing attitudes and actions. They apply 
to the full or mature form of the attitude, allowing exceptions in other cases, so long 
as the fact that the case is an exception explains why the case is less than 
paradigmatic of full intention, and allows for the possibility of people playing with the 
norms, twisting them in a variety of ways, a phenomenon very familiar from creative 
ways of using language, which achieve an effect by deviating from the norms (of 
meaning or grammar, etc.).  
So the revised version of the Thesis retains its role in the explanation of action and 





was viewed with favour was the keystone keeping in place and bridging the theory of 
value, the theory of normativity and rationality and the understanding of intentional 
action. Its success in fulfilling this key role makes the version here defended a variant 
of the traditional Thesis, serving the same role in establishing the interconnections of 
those wider theories. 
